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FACING FACTS: JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO SECTION 4 
OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 
 
 
The issuing of a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA) was once likened by Jack Straw to an “unexploded bomb” landing in a minister’s 
room.1 It is therefore unsurprising that a low number of declarations of incompatibility have 
been made.2 But the traditional judicial approach to section 4 is unsatisfactory and unduly 
deferential to the executive.3 In particular, courts should consider looking beyond the instant 
case when deciding whether to make a declaration of incompatibility to look at the impugned 
legislation more generally.4 Although a victim is required to launch an action against a public 
authority under the HRA,5 nothing in the text of the HRA requires an actual victim’s rights to 
be violated for a section 4 declaration to be made.6 Indeed, sections 3 and 4 apply to all 
litigation, even if no public authority is involved.7 The courts’ current approach logically 
involves the consideration of the instant case as a potential example of incompatibility. If an 
incompatibility is found, the legislation will then be declared incompatible on its face—and it 
will follow that the present applicant’s rights have been violated, although no remedy will be 
forthcoming.8 A difficulty arises where the instant case is not thought to be especially 
compelling despite flaws in the legislation becoming apparent—under what circumstances, if 
                                                     
1 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Judicial Appointments Process, Oral and Written 
Evidence Q.133 (2011). 
2 At the time of the last Ministry of Justice report (December 2014), 29 declarations had been made since the 
HRA came into force on 2 October 2000, of which 20 declarations had become final: Ministry of Justice, 
Responding to Human Rights Judgments, Cm. 8962 (2014), at p.5. The reports are usually produced annually, 
but the report for 2014–15 has been overdue since December 2015. Two of the declarations made since the 2014 
report was published are discussed in this paper: R. (on the application of Miranda) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 6; [2016] 1 W.L.R. 1505 and R. (on the application of Johnson) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 56; [2016] 3 W.L.R. 1267. 
3 Although the powers of the HRA apply to senior courts UK-wide, in the interests of space, this paper will 
largely concentrate on the position in England and Wales. 
4 See also R. Buxton, “The Future of Declarations of Incompatibility” [2010] P.L. 213, especially at 215. 
5 HRA s.7(1). 
6 Because s.7 only applies to the regime under HRA ss.6–8 on public authorities. See further below. 
7 That much is clear enough from the terms of the HRA itself, but for confirmation, see J. Wadham, H. 
Mountfield, E. Prochaska and R. Desai, Blackstone’s Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998, 7th edn (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015) (subsequently “Blackstone’s Guide”), at para.3.04. 
8 HRA s.4(6) and cf. the discussion of Miranda below. 
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any, should a declaration still be made? While courts have to consider the particulars of the 
instant case when using the section 3 interpretation duty, or when deciding whether to give a 
remedy under section 8, the instant case should not necessarily be the end of the story where 
section 4 is concerned. Domestic traditions as well as comparisons with other courts—
particularly the US courts and the European Court of Human Rights—have combined to 
cause a reluctance to use section 4. Against the background of the UK courts’ traditional 
approach, two recent (and somewhat related) cases will be used as case studies to show the 
(different) wrong turns the courts have taken recently: Beghal v D.P.P.,9 and R. (on the 
application of Miranda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.10  
Of course not all courts have the power to make declarations of incompatibility,11 and 
a court has no duty to make a section 4 declaration—as is well known, the section explicitly 
says that a court “may” make a declaration if it finds that a provision is incompatible with a 
Convention right.12 And a court cannot make a declaration on a whim—the Crown must 
receive 21 days’ notice in cases where the court is considering making a declaration.13 A 
party alleging a Convention breach must therefore give notice as to whether a section 4 
declaration is being sought and must set out in a statement of case why the legislation is 
apparently incompatible.14 But, assuming that notice has been given and whilst respecting the 
courts’ discretion, they could, and should, be more robust in making declarations.  
The courts have been said to be reluctant to make judgments beyond the instant case 
in front of them.15 That is to say, if the court is not convinced that there has been a breach of 
potentially incompatible legislation in the instant case, the court will usually (but not always) 
                                                     
9 [2015] UKSC 49; [2016] A.C. 88. 
10 [2016] EWCA Civ 6. 
11 The courts with the power to make such declarations are listed in HRA s.4(5). 
12 Which can be contrasted with the mandatory interpretation provision in HRA s.3, where the court “must”, so 
far as possible, read and give effect to legislation in a way which is compatible with Convention rights. 
13 HRA s.5(1) and Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) 19.4A(1). 
14 CPR Practice Direction 16, para.15.1. 
15 D. Bonner, H. Fenwick and S. Harris-Short, “Judicial Approaches to the Human Rights Act” (2003) 52 
I.C.L.Q. 549 at 568. 
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choose not to make a declaration of incompatibility. That reluctance is understandable given 
that the courts are used to working on a case-by-case basis. But that traditional approach is 
not necessarily appropriate for the very different task, given to the courts by section 4 of the 
HRA, of reviewing legislation more generally, beyond its application in an individual case. 
Section 4 is vague in its terms. To make a declaration, the court must be “satisfied that the 
provision is incompatible with a Convention right”. But does that mean that the provision 
must be incompatible across all its applications, or incompatible only in this particular case, 
or potentially incompatible in certain other cases? The courts have tended towards the answer 
that the legislation must be incompatible across all its applications,16 and that an 
incompatibility should be demonstrated in the instant case, thus restricting the use of section 
4. But as has been argued elsewhere, taking a case-specific approach, rather than looking at 
the general terms of the legislation, “diminish[es]” the effect of the HRA and makes case law 
“significantly less predictable”.17 Where the courts have looked beyond the instant case, such 
as in Miranda, the beginnings of a better approach can be seen. That case, however, showed a 
court unsure of how to follow such an approach, as we will see later. Unusual cases such as 
R. (on the application of Johnson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department may arise, 
where a declaration was made despite not being required for the instant case, although a 
breach was established.18 Coupled with Miranda, a possible “expository justice approach” is 
emerging, the suggested parameters of which are set out in this article.19 The courts’ 
legitimacy in resolving rights issues is usually “strengthened by being grounded in the actual 
                                                     
16 At least in relation to certain groups—see further below. 
17 A.P. Simester, J.R. Spencer, F. Stark, G.R. Sullivan and G.J. Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: 
Theory and Doctrine, 6th edn (Oxford: Hart, 2016) (subsequently “Simester and Sullivan”), at sec.2.5(i)(b). 
18 [2016] UKSC 56. For a summary of the facts, see A.L. Young, “Towards an Expository Justice Approach to 
Human Rights Adjudication?” U.K. Const. L. Blog (October 25, 2016) (subsequently “Towards an Expository 
Justice Approach?”). 
19 Young, “Towards an Expository Justice Approach?”. See also, for earlier examples of s.4 as a method of 
expository justice, A. Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement: Open Remedies in Human Rights Adjudication 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), at pp.108–110 (subsequently Beyond Disagreement). 
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experience of litigants”.20 Judicial legitimacy may therefore be called into question in cases 
where declarations are not required to decide the instant case. Provided, however, that the 
courts limit themselves to cases where future incompatibilities will very clearly arise, without 
too much conjecture, legitimacy can be maintained. 
The approach recommended here would result in a modest increase in section 4 use. 
Given that section 3, rather than section 4, is the section which has been accused of 
“undermin[ing] Parliamentary sovereignty”,21 the approach endorsed here should be 
workable in practice without unduly raising political eyebrows (or hackles), for reasons 
which will be further developed in this paper. The argument advanced here is also likely to 
survive any changes to our human rights architecture, since nothing in the Conservative 
Party’s plans for a Bill of Rights so far suggests that a section 4-type power would be 
removed.22 It is the section 3 power, given its controversy, that faces being watered down to 
“[p]revent our laws from being effectively re-written through ‘interpretation’”.23  
It is impossible to tell how many extra declarations might be made if the approach 
endorsed here were followed. It may lead to more declarations being sought, although the 
lack of remedy in the instant case must surely limit the likely number of applicants, most of 
whom seek a declaration as a “fallback” or “booby prize”.24 More declarations would likely 
be issued, but a declaration would not be issued in every case in which it is sought. Certain 
challenges to Acts will undoubtedly be unsuccessful, either because the legislation is 
genuinely compatible, or because the court would have to strain too hard to find a potential 
incompatibility. It is likely that the issuing of declarations of incompatibility will increase 
                                                     
20 K. Roach, “Remedies for Laws that Violate Human Rights” in J. Bell, M. Elliott, J.N.E. Varuhas and P. 
Murray (eds.), Public Law Adjudication in Common Law Systems: Process and Substance (Oxford: Hart, 2016), 
p.269 at p.290. 
21 Conservative Party, Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing 
Britain’s Human Rights Laws (2014), at p.4 (subsequently Protecting Human Rights in the UK). 
22 There is no mention of section 4 whatsoever in Protecting Human Rights in the UK. 
23 Protecting Human Rights in the UK, at p.6. 
24 T. Hickman, “Bill of Rights Reform and the Case for Going Beyond the Declaration of Incompatibility 
Model” [2015] N.Z.L.R. 35 at 56. 
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anyway if the section 3 power is narrowed as the current nascent Bill of Rights plans suggest. 
It is possible, then, that coupled with the approach endorsed here, section 4 (or its Bill of 
Rights equivalent) could become more controversial than it is at present. But declarations 
should not be controversial. They do not give undue power to the judiciary. Shying away 
from making declarations of incompatibility in fact shows undue deference to the executive 
at the expense of parliamentary intention. Despite plans to curb section 3, the executive find 
declarations of incompatibility to be more publicly embarrassing than the “subterranean 
method” of interpretation.25 We might also hope that any increase in declarations is offset by 
a reduction caused by pre-HRA statutes being increasingly replaced by post-HRA statutes.26 
 
THE LIMITED UTILITY OF COMPARISONS WITH OTHER COURTS 
Before looking at the domestic approach, it is worth pausing to consider some comparisons 
with other courts because such comparisons may have caused misapprehensions as to the 
proper role of our domestic courts. 
 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
Under section 2 of the HRA, the UK courts have a duty to take Strasbourg jurisprudence into 
account in determining cases dealing with Convention rights. The UK courts have interpreted 
this provision according to the so-called “mirror principle”, meaning that they should do “no 
more, but certainly no less” than Strasbourg.27 But a comparison with Strasbourg may not 
always be appropriate. The section 2 duty, and particularly how it has been interpreted by the 
UK courts, may be hampering our domestic courts from being more robust in exercising their 
                                                     
25 A. Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) (subsequently Constitutional Review), at p.230. 
26 Despite, of course, Convention-compatibility not being guaranteed: HRA s.19. 
27 R. (on the application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26; [2004] 2 A.C. 323 at [20] per Lord 
Bingham. 
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power to make section 4 declarations. The Strasbourg court must limit itself to a case-specific 
approach because applicants have to be “victims” within the meaning of Article 34 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). But our domestic courts’ section 4 power is 
very different, as will be demonstrated in this paper. Domestic courts should not, therefore, 
shy away from making declarations of incompatibility, even if they suppose that the ECtHR 
would not have found a breach in the instant case, if they are convinced that the legislation 
more generally has the potential to breach Convention rights. Criticism of the mirror 
principle is recent years is, therefore, to be welcomed.28 In particular, Lord Brown’s dicta in 
Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust about the rationale behind the mirror principle should be 
noted carefully:29 
 
“[W]hat the Ullah principle importantly establishes is that the domestic court should not feel 
driven on Convention grounds unwillingly to decide a case against a public authority (which 
could not then seek a corrective judgment in Strasbourg) unless the existing Strasbourg case 
law clearly compels this.” 
 
In other words, the mirror principle was designed to alert domestic courts to the dangers of 
going further in protecting Convention rights than is warranted. A decision that goes too far, 
once it reaches the Supreme Court, is irreversible because core public authorities cannot 
themselves be victims under the HRA/ECHR and therefore cannot appeal to Strasbourg. 
Because a declaration of incompatibility has no effect in law, and does not impact on a public 
authority without parliamentary acceptance of the declaration by way of amending 
legislation, the rationale of the mirror principle is not applicable to section 4 cases. A section 
                                                     
28 See, for example, Lord Kerr in Ambrose v Harris [2011] UKSC 43; [2011] 1 W.L.R. 2435 at [126]–[130] and 
Sugar v BBC [2012] UKSC 4; [2012] 1 W.L.R. 439 at [59] per Lord Wilson and [113] per Lord Mance. For a 
summary of other sources of criticism, see A. Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme 
Court (Oxford: Hart, 2013), at pp.230–231. 
29 [2012] UKSC 2; [2012] 2 A.C. 72 at [112]. 
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4 declaration does not move the law on in any irreversible way and should not necessarily, 
therefore, be exercised with an eye on Strasbourg. Furthermore, because declarations have no 
immediate legal effect, they threaten neither legal certainty nor judicial legitimacy because 
they cannot have “unforeseen consequences” for parties beyond the instant case.30 
Declarations which are not required for the instant case are therefore not necessarily 
problematic because they do not affect the law without further action. 
 
US courts 
Comparisons with US courts have been drawn by various commentators.31 In American 
constitutional jurisprudence, the terms “facial challenge” and “as-applied” challenge are 
widely used. The terms are not well-known in the UK jurisdictions. That is understandable—
they in fact have limited use for reasons which will become clear. The terms are, however, 
worth exploring for the limited use they do have, and for confusion which they may cause if a 
transplant into the UK is attempted.  
In a facial challenge in the US courts, an Act (or a provision) is struck down if it is 
thought to be unconstitutional across all its possible applications. It is difficult for the 
applicant to succeed because she must “must establish that no set of circumstances exists 
under which the Act would be valid”.32 In an as-applied challenge, an Act (or a provision) 
may have its application limited if it is deemed to be unconstitutional in certain 
circumstances i.e. as against an individual or a group.33 The US courts have claimed that 
facial challenges are, and should be, rarely successful, although this claim has been 
                                                     
30 Young, “Towards an Expository Justice Approach?”. 
31 See, for example, Simester and Sullivan, at sec.2.5(1)(b); and Kavanagh, Constitutional Review, at pp.291–
293. 
32 US v Salerno 481 U.S. 739 at 745 (1987), except in First Amendment cases where the “overbreadth” doctrine 
applies (where the Act is said to have too many unconstitutional applications). 
33 See R.N. Pine, “Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights” 
(1988) 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 655 at 701. 
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questioned (both empirically and normatively) by writers such as Fallon.34 Reasons which 
can be advanced for the rarity of facial challenges in the US do not apply in the UK 
jurisdictions. For starters, the UK courts have no strike down power. Declarations of 
incompatibility can be made more readily since they have only political, not legal, 
implications. Any reluctance of the US courts to use (or at least admit to using) such a drastic 
measure do not apply to the UK’s less drastic alternative.35 Linked to that is the fact that the 
UK courts need not worry about impinging on parliamentary sovereignty when they make a 
section 4 declaration. In making such a declaration, the courts are only doing what they have 
been tasked to do by Parliament under the terms of the HRA. That Act was (although certain 
politicians, and even some commentators,36 would no doubt disagree) drafted carefully so as 
to ensure the continuing sovereignty of Parliament.37 As Lord Woolf has said, when 
exercising their powers under the Human Rights Act, the courts are “only doing what they 
have to swear to do on appointment and that is to give a judgment according to law”.38 The 
judges therefore act “in support of Parliament not otherwise” when they make declarations of 
incompatibility.39 The US courts’ strike down power, stemming as it does from the common 
law,40 has far more implications for sovereignty, not just in its operation but in its very 
existence. It is therefore more natural to assume that the US courts could feel cautious about 
                                                     
34 R.H. Fallon, “Fact and Fiction about Facial Challenges” (2011) 99 California Law Review 915 at 917–918 
and generally (subsequently “Fact and Fiction”).  
35 Cf. Kavanagh, Constitutional Review, who argues that the declaration of incompatibility mechanism is “a 
considerably stronger judicial tool than is often assumed” and not very different from a strike down power given 
its effect: at p.289. See too Lord Hoffmann, “Human Rights and the House of Lords” (1999) 62 M.L.R. 159 at 
159–160. The strength of these arguments is weakened by the fact that, since they were made, we have an 
example of legislation not being amended after a declaration of incompatibility: see below. 
36 See, for example, Bogdanor’s assertion that “[i]n practice, the principle of the rule of law, as embodied in the 
Human Rights Act, may be coming to supersede the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament”: V. Bogdanor, 
The New British Constitution (Oxford: Hart, 2009), at p.74, and ch.3 generally. See also Kavanagh’s view that 
“the HRA only preserves the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in formal terms”: Constitutional Review, at 
p.336 and ch.11 generally. 
37 In relation to s.4, see HL Deb., vol.584 col.1294 (January 19, 1998) (Lord Chancellor (Irvine)); Rights 
Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, Cm. 3782 (1997), at para.2.13. 
38 Lord Woolf, “The Impact of Human Rights” in Lord Woolf (ed. by C. Campbell-Holt), The Pursuit of Justice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.209 at p.219. 
39 Woolf, “The Impact of Human Rights”, at p.219. 
40 Marbury v Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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exercising that function. It appears from the cases discussed below that the UK courts too feel 
uncomfortable, but they should not feel shy about using a power which was granted to them 
by Parliament. Section 4 is, after all, merely part of the “healthy democratic dialogue” 
between the courts and the executive and legislature set up by the HRA.41 It is because of the 
dialogic nature of declarations of incompatibility that they are primarily a form of expository, 
rather than adjudicative, justice.42 In other words, as we will see later, the function of 
declarations is not merely to “determine disputes … but generally to expound the law”.43 It is 
therefore entirely constitutionally proper for declarations to be made where they are not 
required for the instant case. 
Yet, as in America,44 there is an uneasiness in the UK jurisdictions about determining 
constitutional (including human rights) issues in “concrete disputes between parties”.45 All 
cases start off as “as-applied” cases because a specific person is saying that a law is 
unconstitutional as applied against her.46 Courts do not typically like to anticipate future 
questions as opposed to limiting themselves to the instant facts in front of them, including in 
constitutional matters.47 A section 4 declaration has the result that the affected legislation is 
incompatible across all its applications. But that is quite different from mandating that the 
court has to ascertain that there are no possible ostensibly compatible ways to apply a piece 
of legislation. The difference will be explained further below. The US method of “facial 
challenge” is not therefore an appropriate transplant into the UK jurisdictions.48 Equally, we 
                                                     
41 Blackstone’s Guide, at p.vi. See also G. Marshall, “The Lynchpin of Parliamentary Intention: Lost, Stolen or 
Strained?” [2003] P.L. 236 at 243 and F. Klug, “Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act 1998” (2003) 2 
E.H.R.L.R. 125. Cf. T. Hickman, “Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories and the Human Rights Act 
1998” [2005] P.L. 306 and Kavanagh, Constitutional Review, at pp.409–410. 
42 J. Miles, “Standing under the Human Rights Act 1998: Theories of Rights Enforcement & The Nature of 
Public Law Adjudication” (2000) 59 C.L.J. 133 at 164 (subsequently “Standing under the HRA”). 
43 Miles, “Standing under the HRA” at 153. 
44 See K.L. Karst, “Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation” [1960] The Supreme Court Review 75 at 77 
and 98. 
45 Fallon, “Fact and Fiction” at 923. 
46 Fallon, “Fact and Fiction” at 923. 
47 Fallon, “Fact and Fiction” at 929. 
48 Cf. Simester and Sullivan, at sec.2.5(i)(b). 
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may use the term “as-applied” to suggest that the court has considered the individual 
circumstances of the case.49 But in America, as-applied challenges mean that the legislation 
may be disapplied only in certain circumstances. That disapplication will undoubtedly be 
based on the instant case. But it does not necessarily follow that the UK courts, in looking at 
the facts of a specific case, make a declaration only in respect of a certain category of people. 
The issue tackled in this paper is the courts taking a case-specific approach, regardless of 
whether any declaration impugns the whole provision, or is more restrictive.50 For those 
reasons, the term “case-specific” rather than “as-applied” is used in this paper to refer to 
cases where the question of compatibility is determined based on the instant facts, rather than 
looking more broadly at the legislation.  
 
THE TRADITIONAL RELUCTANT APPROACH 
The courts famously view declarations of incompatibility as “a measure of last resort”.51 In 
one sense, the courts have to take such a view, given the relationship between sections 3 and 
4 of the HRA.52 That well-known relationship is not examined in depth here. Instead, the 
central consideration is whether, having discounted section 3, the courts should always limit 
themselves to the facts of a particular case when deciding whether to make a declaration. 
That question should be answered in the negative. 
It may not always be easy to tell whether the court is taking a case-specific or a 
broader approach, or whether the court thinks that incompatibility must be established in all 
possible circumstances or only in certain circumstances. Frequently the court will not explain 
explicitly that it is taking either path. Indeed the difference only really matters when, on the 
facts of the case before it, the court decides not to make a declaration, whilst still finding a 
                                                     
49 This appears to be the meaning given in Simester and Sullivan, at sec.2.5(i)(b). 
50 For an example of a somewhat restrictive declaration, see the discussion of Miranda below. 
51 R. v A. (No.2) [2001] UKHL 25; [2002] 1 A.C. 45 at [44] per Lord Steyn. 
52 Kavanagh, Constitutional Review, at p.124. 
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flaw with an Act. If the court makes the declaration, it should not matter whether they 
concern themselves only with the instant case, or with the legislation more generally.53 
Likewise, if legislation truly is compatible then it makes no difference which approach is 
taken. It only makes a difference when the facts of the case are not compelling enough to 
convince the court to issue a declaration,54 despite the fact that the legislation, in certain other 
applications, is thought to be more problematic. 
There are certain examples of the courts looking beyond the instant case when making 
a declaration of incompatibility. One such example is R. (on the application of Anderson) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department,55 in which the Home Secretary’s role in setting 
tariffs for convicted murderers was declared incompatible with Article 6 of the ECHR 
because the non-independent Home Secretary was fulfilling a judicial function in making 
sentencing decisions “even if he does no more than confirm what the judges have 
recommended”.56 The fact that this particular case was especially compelling (because of the 
Home Secretary’s departure from the judicial recommendation) does not appear to have 
affected the court’s decision. There were, however, no circumstances in which the Home 
Secretary’s power could be exercised in a Convention-compliant way. The situation is more 
difficult, and less clear, when the legislation can be exercised in both compatible and 
incompatible ways. 
Take, for example, Percy v D.P.P.57 Percy concerned a conviction under section 5 of 
the Public Order Act 1986, a provision which criminalises a wide range of activity. Section 5 
makes it a crime to use “threatening or abusive words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour” 
or to display “any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening or 
                                                     
53 Unless a somewhat restrictive declaration is made, such as in Miranda, as discussed below.  
54 Or are compelling but do not require the issuing of a declaration as in R. (on the application of Johnson) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 56. 
55 [2002] UKHL 46; [2003] 1 A.C. 837. 
56 Anderson at [28] per Lord Bingham. 
57 [2001] EWHC Admin 1125; (2002) 166 J.P. 93. 
  
12 
abusive, within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or 
distress thereby”.58 A section 4 declaration was sought to the effect that the appellant’s 
conviction was incompatible with her freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. Ms 
Percy was a protestor at an American airbase who defaced and trampled upon the American 
flag. The court held that section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 in general did not violate 
Article 10 of the ECHR because not every section 5 conviction would engage Article 10. It 
was held that where there is only the possibility that the enforcement of a provision will 
infringe a Convention right, sections 6–8 of the HRA should be used in a case-specific way.59  
As noted above, sections 6–8 of the HRA deal with the breach of Convention rights 
by public authorities. Public authorities will be held to have breached Convention rights 
unless such a breach was unavoidable as a result of primary legislation, or if the public 
authority was merely giving effect to primary or secondary legislation “which cannot be read 
or given effect in a way which is compatible”.60 The crucial question to consider therefore is 
when legislation can be read in a way which is compatible. According to the court in Percy, 
the answer is that legislation can be read in a way which is compatible unless every operation 
of the legislation would breach Convention rights. That is to say that sections 3 and 4 should 
only be used where the decision-maker has no discretion to allow the legislation to operate 
compatibly. Where the court thinks (as it did in Percy) that such discretion does exist, it will 
consider sections 6–8 of the HRA instead. This approach is arguably appropriate in Percy—
given the wide scope of the relevant legislation, much discretion for the decision-maker 
exists. But this approach poses problems if applied to other cases. It may not always be easy 
(or indeed possible) to ascertain whether every possible invocation of a statute will breach 
                                                     
58 At the time of this case, “insulting” words, behaviour or visual representations were also included in the 
statutory definition, but were removed by the Crime and Courts Act 2013 s.57(2). 
59 In this case, her conviction was found to be incompatible with Article 10. For further explanation, see D. 
O’Brien, “Judicial Review under the Human Rights Act 1998: Legislative or Applied Review?” (2007) 5 
E.H.R.L.R. 550 at 557–559 (subsequently “Legislative or Applied Review?”). 
60 HRA s.6(1) and (2). 
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Convention rights and thus the court may shy away from making the declaration. Public 
authorities must constantly be vigilant as to whether a particular exercise of their powers will 
be Convention-compliant. Basing section 4 decisions on specific cases rather than the 
legislation as whole may make legislation even more difficult for decision-makers to 
navigate. Furthermore, the choice between sections 3–4 and sections 6–8 will not be available 
in all cases, since not all cases involve a public authority. In certain circumstances, then, the 
courts should move away from case-specific reasoning altogether and simply examine the 
legislation on its face. This argument will be substantiated later in the paper in relation to the 
Beghal case. 
Is it possible for a court to make a declaration where there is no “victim” under 
section 7 of the HRA? On this issue, the courts have sometimes expressed hesitation. In R. 
(on the application of Rusbridger) v Attorney General61 the editor of a national newspaper 
sought clarification of Victorian legislation which made it a crime to advocate republicanism, 
and a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the HRA if necessary. The court stated 
that there was no need for a person to be a “victim” in order to rely on section 4 of the 
HRA.62 In this case there was no victim since no charges had been brought, although articles 
“which unambiguously advocated republicanism” had been published.63 But it was equally 
clear that “victimless” cases may often be doomed to fail, as this one was, the court holding 
that:64 
 
“[I]t is not the function of the courts to keep the statute book up to date … sections 3 and 4 of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 are not intended to be an instrument by which the courts can 
                                                     
61 [2003] UKHL 38; [2004] 1 A.C. 357. 
62 Rusbridger at [21] per Lord Steyn. 
63 Rusbridger at [10] per Lord Steyn. 
64 Rusbridger at [36] per Lord Hutton. See also Lord Rodger at [58] and Lord Walker at [61]. 
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chivvy Parliament into spring-cleaning the statute book.”65 
 
The obsolete legislation was not causing any mischief in practice, and pressures on 
parliamentary time are great. But “spring-cleaning” (here taken to mean repealing a provision 
without a replacement enactment) could easily be swept up in the Law Commissions’ regular 
Statute Law (Repeals) Bills. Many declarations of incompatibility, however, cannot 
reasonably be described as “spring-cleaning” given that they are designed to prompt new 
legislation to be drafted and enacted. In such cases, a lack of parliamentary time is unlikely to 
be an appropriate shield to hide behind given that a fundamental human right is at stake. In 
addition, as will be argued further below, declarations open up the option to use section 10 of 
the HRA to amend legislation with minimal parliamentary time. 
As Buxton has correctly pointed out, the effect of a declaration in a particular case 
clearly must be “secondary” to section 4’s “role as a machinery for purging the statute book 
of non-conforming provisions” because section 4 provides no remedy for the applicant.66 In 
Rusbridger, given that the court said it was “unreal” to suggest that the impugned provision 
could survive post-HRA,67 why not just make the declaration? Perhaps, in addition to 
practical concerns about parliamentary time, the court felt too shackled by its traditional role, 
but section 4 is a different power which requires a different approach. 
Similarly, in Lancashire C.C. v Taylor, the court decided that, although technically a 
victim is not needed, making a declaration where there was no victim would go against 
section 7 of the HRA.68 The court stressed the fact that it would not entertain “purely 
hypothetical” arguments.69 Given the “desirably flexible approach to the grant of 
                                                     
65 The reference to s.3 is especially peculiar since use of s.3 cannot be described as any sort of “chivvying” of 
Parliament. 
66 R. Buxton, “The Future of Declarations of Incompatibility” [2010] P.L. 213 at 214. See HRA, s.4(6). 
67 Rusbridger at [28] per Lord Steyn. 
68 [2005] EWCA Civ 284; [2005] 1 W.L.R. 2668 at [44] per Lord Woolf. 
69 Lancashire C.C. at [43] per Lord Woolf. 
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declarations”,70 the court is perfectly entitled to decide not to issue a declaration. It is a 
discretionary remedy, but discretion must be properly exercised and, in this case, undue 
reliance was placed on section 7. As already established, the need for a victim clearly only 
bites in relation to actions by public authorities.71 In other words, section 7 only provides “the 
mechanism for bringing proceedings in reliance on s.6”;72 it has no relevance where section 4 
is used instead. In Lancashire C.C., counsel for the Secretary of State (acting as intervenor) 
argued successfully that:73 
 
“If the issue had arisen otherwise than under primary legislation, [the appellant] would not 
rank as a victim under section 7(1) HRA and could not therefore advance any such claim 
under the Convention. The same … must be true under section 4 HRA.” 
 
But this argument is a non sequitur—what applies to the scheme under sections 6–8 of the 
Act does not necessarily (and does not in fact) apply to sections 3 and 4. Counsel also argued 
successfully: (i) that section 4 was not an actio popularis; and (ii) that its application could 
only be argued in an otherwise “tenable” case.74 But it is possible to accept that section 4 is 
not an actio popularis whilst still holding that a declaration may be made in an otherwise 
unsuccessful case. That is to say that whilst a case must be brought by someone with 
standing75 and not based on a completely hypothetical argument, there is nothing in the 
wording of the HRA to prevent the court from granting a declaration in a case which has been 
                                                     
70 Lancashire C.C. at [44] per Lord Woolf. 
71 HRA ss.6–8. 
72 Annotation to HRA s.7 on Westlaw UK. See also Blackstone’s Guide, at para.4.79; B. Dickson, Human 
Rights in the UK Supreme Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), at p.73; A. Lester, D. Pannick and J. 
Herberg, Human Rights Law and Practice, 3rd edn (London: LexisNexis, 2009), at para.2.7; and Sathanapally, 
Beyond Disagreement, at p.108. 
73 Lancashire C.C. at [28]. 
74 Lancashire C.C. at [28]. 
75 Based not on victimhood but on the more generous standing rules of the Senior Courts Act 1981 s.31(3). 
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brought by an applicant in good faith that she has a tenable argument, but the court being less 
convinced.  
Readers will of course be familiar with the text of section 4, but it is worth looking at 
the precise wording closely: 
 
“(1) Subsection (2) applies in any proceedings in which a court determines whether a 
provision of primary legislation is compatible with a Convention right. 
(2) If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right, it may 
make a declaration of that incompatibility.” 
 
In addition, of course, section 4(6) provides no remedy for the instant party. Section 4 makes 
no mention of a victim, nor for the need for a breach in the instant case. The terms of section 
4 put the provision, not the applicant, centre stage. As Buxton has argued, litigation between 
two specific parties is only the “necessary context” for declarations of incompatibility 
because of the English courts’ inability to act “of [their] own motion”.76 Similarly, in a US-
context, Spann has said that dispute resolution is a “charade” which hides the courts’ true 
purpose of “tell[ing] us how to conform our behavior to our fundamental values”.77 It has 
long been recognised that public law judgments can have “extended impact” far beyond the 
parties to a particular case.78 Specifically, “[d]eclarations of incompatibility always have the 
potential to touch on circumstances not before the court given that legislation often has a 
broad application”.79 Declarations are therefore always at least partially expository in 
nature.80 
                                                     
76 Buxton, “The Future of Declarations of Incompatibility” at 214–215. 
77 G.A. Spann, “Expository Justice” (1983) 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 585 at 585. 
78 A. Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89 Harv. L.R. 1281 at 1297. See also 
Miles, “Standing under the HRA” at 153. 
79 Young, “Towards an Expository Justice Approach?”. 
80 Miles “Standing under the HRA” at 137; Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement, at pp.110–111. 
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During the passage of the Human Rights Bill, an amendment (number 103) was 
proposed to add a clause 4(2A) to the Bill:81 
 
“(2A) A court may not make a declaration of incompatibility unless it is necessary for the 
purpose of determining the matter before it.” 
 
 The amendment was defeated,82 on the basis that:83 
 
“The purpose of a declaration is to draw attention to a legislative incompatibility with the 
convention and to act as a trigger for a remedial order under … [section 10]. A declaration of 
incompatibility has no effect on the case before the court … Amendment No. 103 would 
prevent a declaration from being made unless that were specifically necessary to determine 
the case in question, yet the kinds of cases where the issues are likely to arise will almost 
inevitably be complex and involve different issues, each of which will have to be resolved by 
the court … Amendment No. 103 … has no place in the scheme that we have established in 
… [section 4]. The Government believe that this group of amendments [of which amendment 
number 103 was one] is fundamentally misconceived.” 
 
This defeated amendment makes it clear—once section 4 is on the table, the court may look 
beyond the present case at the impugned legislation more generally. In R. (on the application 
of Nasseri) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Lord Hoffmann stated that, given 
the very great discretion afforded to the court in section 4 cases, he would “not … wish to 
exclude” the possibility of a declaration being made where the public authority was not 
                                                     
81 HC Deb., vol.313 col.437 (June 3, 1998) (Alan Haselhurst). A related unsuccessful amendment was proposed 
to add to the end of clause 4(2) the words “setting out the nature and extent thereof in so far as arises from the 
nature of the case before the court”. The proposed amendment was designed, amongst other things, to “give 
judges a clear indication that declarations of incompatibility should not be issued unless required to resolve a 
particular case before the court”: HC Deb., vol.313 col.451 (June, 3 1998) (Anne McIntosh). 
82 By 320 votes to 128: HC Deb., vol.313 cols 461–464 (June 3, 1998). 
83 HC Deb., vol.313 col.460 (June 3, 1998) (Geoff Hoon). 
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acting incompatibly in the instant case.84 Such cases would, however, be “rare”, and Nasseri 
was not one of them.85  
Overall, the courts have shown reluctance to make declarations where the instant case 
is not compelling. But, compared to the unthreatening legislation considered in Rusbridger, is 
the same true even when the court sees real dangers lurking in the legislation? Beghal 
provides the answer. 
 
CASE STUDY 1: BEGHAL 
Beghal v D.P.P.86 concerned the wife of a convicted terrorist who was stopped at East 
Midlands Airport when she was returning from visiting her husband.87 She was stopped 
under schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 which allows for stopping, questioning, 
searching and detaining at ports and borders. Under paragraph 2(4) of that schedule, such 
stops can be made regardless of whether the “examining officer”88 has a reasonable suspicion 
that that person is a terrorist. Paragraph 18 of the same schedule makes it a criminal offence 
to fail wilfully to comply with an examining officer’s request. Mrs Beghal was charged with 
the paragraph 18 offence for refusing to answer most of the examining officer’s questions. 
She sought to challenge the compatibility of the relevant legislation. Notably, her arguments 
were “not confined to the facts of [her] case” but comprised a “general challenge to the 
compatibility of the Schedule 7 powers” with the various ECHR rights.89 The court, however, 
(with the exception of Lord Kerr) took a distinctly case-specific approach and declined to 
make a declaration of incompatibility, despite making several criticisms of the legislation in 
question. In other words, the court thought there was no incompatibility in this particular 
                                                     
84 [2009] UKHL 23; [2010] 1 A.C. 1 at [20]. 
85 Nasseri at [20]. 
86 [2015] UKSC 49. 
87 For a full summary of the facts, see S.W. Stark, “Suspicion-less Minds: Anti-terrorism Powers at Ports and 
Borders” (2016) 75 C.L.J. 8. 
88 A constable, immigration officer or customs officer: Terrorism Act 2000 sched.7, para.1(1). 
89 Beghal v D.P.P. [2013] EWHC 2573 (Admin); [2014] Q.B. 607 at [32]–[33]. 
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case, but that the legislation had the potential to be incompatible in other, more extreme 
cases.90 Nasseri was not cited, and Lord Hoffmann’s possibility of making a declaration 
despite the instant facts was not explored. 
Article 8 was engaged but not breached because the interference was “in accordance 
with the law” under Article 8(2). The court noted the different expectations we have at 
airports as opposed to when we are “anywhere in the street”.91 When we enter an airport we 
are aware that we must consent, if we wish to go ahead with our travel plans, to inspections 
of our body, documents and luggage. Only Lord Kerr applied a facial test to the legislation. 
The upper limits of schedule 7, he noted, are not things that a person would normally think 
she is consenting to when entering an airport. For example, to be detained for six hours,92 to 
have items of property seized for up to seven days,93 or to have documents or other data (for 
example, phone or computer records) copied and retained “for so long as is necessary”.94 
None of those things happened to Beghal, but for Lord Kerr that was rightly irrelevant. But 
the majority held that Beghal’s detention was a proportionate restriction on her Article 8 
rights to pursue the legitimate aim of fighting terrorism because, in particular, no data on her 
had been kept. The court did suggest, however, that where such data was kept beyond an 
initial investigatory period, the intrusion into privacy was more “considerable”.95 Lord 
Hughes therefore recommended that such retention should be based on a reasonable 
suspicion, which does not need to be made out for the person to be stopped and have the data 
taken from them in the first place.96 
In terms of Beghal’s Article 5 argument, it was relevant that she had only been 
                                                     
90 Whether the court was expressing a view that the legislation was potentially incompatible or merely being 
critical is debatable, but the strongest suggestion of incompatibility is perhaps in terms of the six-hour detention 
period at [54]. 
91 Beghal at [38] per Lord Hughes, with whom Lord Hodge agreed. 
92 Terrorism Act 2000 sched.7, para.6A(3). 
93 Or longer, if the item is needed as evidence: Terrorism Act 2000 sched.7, para.11. 
94 Terrorism Act 2000 sched.7, para.11A. 
95 Beghal at [57] per Lord Hughes, with whom Lord Hodge agreed. 
96 Beghal at [57]–[58]. See also [72] per Lords Neuberger and Dyson. 
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questioned for around 30 minutes.97 The court found that there was therefore no breach of 
Article 5 because her detention was justified under Article 5(1)(b)—to secure the fulfilment 
of an obligation prescribed by law—and because it was no longer than necessary. But the 
court hinted that at its upper reaches (six hours) the legislation could be more problematic.98 
In addition to the short duration of her detention and the fact that no items were taken 
from her or copied, we may also have limited sympathy for Mrs Beghal because her husband 
was a convicted terrorist. Perhaps, therefore, the examining officer did have genuine cause to 
stop her. But the possible discriminatory operation of schedule 7, where no reasonable 
suspicion of terrorist activity is needed to stop someone, is evident. Although the legislation 
does not appear to be used excessively,99 or in a discriminatory fashion,100 risks nevertheless 
exist. As Lord Kerr noted, it should not matter that the powers were not used in a 
discriminatory fashion in this case, or indeed that they are generally not used in that fashion. 
The important thing is that they could be so used.101 He also noted that the Code of Practice 
for the use of schedule 7 mandates that ethnicity or religion cannot be the only reason for 
stopping someone—the fact that the Code legitimises either of those features as being one 
possible reason to stop someone is troubling.102 A Home Office circular was issued to 
examining officers in the light of Beghal instructing that, pending revisions to the Code, race, 
ethnicity or religion should only be taken into account “if present in association with factors 
which show a connection with the threat from terrorism”.103 Respectfully, it is not clear what 
(if anything) such revisions actually change. 
In a sense, therefore, it is true to say that the court did review the legislation on its 
                                                     
97 In total she was delayed at the airport for around two hours, but part of that time was for prayer at her request. 
98 Beghal at [54]. 
99 According to the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, 0.014% of people travelling through British 
ports in 2014–15 were stopped under schedule 7: D. Anderson, The Terrorism Acts in 2014: Report of the 
Independent Reviewer on the Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 (2015) 
(subsequently “Terrorism Acts Report 2015”), at para.6.3. 
100 Terrorism Acts Report 2015, at para.6.11. 
101 Beghal at [93]. 
102 Beghal at [104]. 
103 Home Office Circular 001/2016: Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (2016). 
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face by looking beyond the four corners of Beghal’s case. The court was evidently not 
convinced that the legislation posed too much of a problem in practice (similar to the court in 
Rusbridger), given the lack of evidence of discriminatory use. Had Beghal’s case been more 
compelling, however, it is clear that the court might have been tempted to make a declaration. 
Despite evidently looking at the Schedule 7 powers more generally, the court specifically 
mentioned that certain aspects must “await a case in which they are directly raised”.104 
Further inspection of the decision in Beghal reveals difficulties. As noted above, 
previous cases, such as Percy, have held that in order to use section 4, legislation must 
necessarily and systematically breach human rights, at least against certain groups. In other 
words, legislation may be incompatible even if certain applications do not breach anyone’s 
Convention rights, if it will always breach someone else’s rights.105 But legislation will be 
compatible if the decision-maker can exercise her discretion in such a way as to avoid an 
incompatibility. As Baroness Hale of Richmond said in M.H. v Secretary of State for the 
Department of Health, if legislation can be operated compatibly “[i]t follows that the section 
itself cannot be incompatible, although the action or inaction of the authorities under it may 
be [incompatible]”.106 Under schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000, the examining officer can 
exercise discretion in various ways. She can decide, for example, whether to stop a person, 
for how long to detain her, which questions to ask her and which documents or other data (if 
any) to retain or copy. If we assume, as is arguably implied in Beghal, that the upper reaches 
of the legislation are incompatible with Convention rights, then the statute merely permits, 
but does not mandate, a breach of Convention rights. Sections 3 and 4 therefore (if the court 
is to be consistent with Percy and M.H.) cannot be used because a breach is not mandated—
an examining officer can, in line with Beghal, stop a person for only 30 minutes, rather than 
                                                     
104 Beghal at [58], in relation to the indefinite retention of data. 
105 See, for example, Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21, [2003] 2 A.C. 467; Re McR’s Application for 
Judicial Review [2002] NIQB 58; [2003] N.I. 1.  
106 [2005] UKHL 60; [2006] 1 A.C. 441 at [32]. 
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six hours, and can decide not to take and keep any data. The court should then, in line with 
Percy and M.H., consider whether there has been a breach of section 6 of the HRA. But this 
approach reveals a problem. The statute permits examining officers to stop people for six 
hours and it permits data to be retained for so long as is necessary. Examining officers 
already have to make difficult decisions as to how to exercise their powers, and cases like 
Beghal make such decisions even more difficult. The Home Office Circular mentioned above 
gives some guidance on who to stop, but that is as far as it goes. How is an examining officer 
to know whether it is acceptable to hold a person for three, four hours, or five hours—where 
is the line to be drawn? How is she to know on what criteria she is permitted to take or copy 
relevant data? For how long and in what circumstances can such copies be kept? The current 
approach exacerbates grey areas in the law which necessarily follow from the uncertain scope 
of each Convention right. Governmental or internal policies are increasingly required, and 
they shift rule-making from Parliament (i.e. the Act itself) to the executive or unelected 
public officials via court decisions. 
In cases like Beghal, it should not matter that Beghal’s situation could have been 
worse—that she was not held for very long, that she had no data kept and that the legislation 
was not being used in a discriminatory fashion. The court is tasked with reviewing the 
legislation, and reviewing its application in relation to Beghal is secondary to that. It does not 
matter that she was only held for 30 minutes. It does not matter that she had no data retained. 
It does not matter that she was not stopped for discriminatory reasons. The fact that she could 
have been held for six hours, that she could have had data retained and that she could have 
been stopped for discriminatory reasons is all we need to know. If legislation permits action 
which is incompatible with Convention rights, even if only at its upper limits, then every 
operation of it, even if less egregious, will be a breach of the Convention. It cannot be right 
that it would be the examining officer’s fault (under section 6 of the HRA) if she is still 
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following the legislation. If Beghal had been held for six hours, rather than 30 minutes, it 
would have been the legislation at fault, not the examining officer. Schedule 7 is overbroad 
and, if it is declared to be incompatible, then applicants like Beghal have had their rights 
breached since the legislation as a whole is incompatible. It should not be unfortunate, and a 
missed opportunity, that Beghal’s detention was not longer, or that data was not copied or 
retained, or that she was not discriminated against. We should not have to wait for another 
person to be detained for a longer period of time (for example) before making a declaration. 
The terms of the HRA do not envisage that we should do so.  
In terrorism-related cases, a court’s critical words in the absence of a declaration will 
usually be picked up by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation in one of his 
reports.107 That may well mean that the court’s words are heeded by the executive and 
Parliament, but the Independent Reviewer’s success rate (although good) is not quite as 
impressive as the success rate when section 4 is used. His recommendations may be rejected 
outright, or may simply not be given the same priority which is afforded to declarations of 
incompatibility.108 For non-terrorism related cases, however, the courts’ suggestions are more 
likely to wither on the vine.109  
An alternative danger lurks in judgments where a declaration is not made, but where 
the relevant legislation is criticised—the executive might rely unduly on suggestions made by 
the judiciary, often without the involvement of Parliament. For example, after it was held in 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v J.J. that a control order imposing an 18-hour 
per day curfew was a breach of Article 5 of the ECHR,110 no curfews of longer than 16 hours 
                                                     
107 For example, Beghal is referred to extensively in the Terrorism Acts Report 2015: see especially paras.6.33–
6.39. The dialogue in fact works both ways since the court in Beghal made references to earlier Terrorism Act 
Reports: see, for example, Beghal at [19]–[26]. 
108 Terrorism Acts Report 2015, at paras.1.5, 1.9–1.11 and 11.1 and, on the success of declarations of 
incompatibility, see below. 
109 See, for example, R. (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38; [2015] A.C. 
657 on assisted dying, where the court declined to make a declaration in the unrealised hope that their analysis 
could be used by Parliament to amend the law. 
110 [2007] UKHL 45; [2008] 1 A.C. 385. 
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were imposed by the Home Secretary,111 despite the legislation (the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005) not mentioning any specific limit. More worryingly, certain curfews of shorter 
durations were increased to 16 hours on the basis of Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood’s 
dicta that 16 hours was the maximum he thought a curfew should last.112 The executive relied 
on that statement despite other judges in J.J. stating that it would be “inappropriate” to set a 
fixed period of time beyond which a curfew would breach Article 5.113 The new system under 
the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 provides for overnight 
curfews only.114 It would have been preferable for the court in the control orders cases115 to 
have made a declaration of incompatibility to allow the Government to rethink the entire area 
of law,116 rather than allowing the Government to simply give effect to the court’s specific 
criticisms.117 The control orders cases “provided the government with an opportunity to resist 
political pressure to liberalise the control order regime”.118 For that reason, the proposals 
made here actually better preserve proper checks and balances than the judiciary’s current 
preference for making criticisms rather than declarations, by allowing the ball to be put 
firmly back into the executive’s court for further reconsideration by them, and then, 
importantly, by Parliament. 
 
                                                     
111 D. Anderson, Control Orders in 2011: Final Report of the Independent Reviewer on the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005 (2012), at para.3.29. 
112 K.D. Ewing and J.-C. Tham, “The Continuing Futility of the Human Rights Act” [2008] P.L. 668 at 691; J.J. 
at [105]. 
113 J.J. at [16] per Lord Bingham. See also [63] per Lady Hale and [84] per Lord Carswell. 
114 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 sched.1, para.1. 
115 Three control order cases were heard together: J.J.; Secretary of State for the Home Department v E. [2007] 
UKHL 47; [2008] 1 A.C. 499; and Secretary of State for the Home Department v M.B. & A.F. [2007] UKHL 
46; [2008] 1 A.C. 440. 
116 A declaration of incompatibility was only sought in M.B. & A.F. For further criticism see Ewing and Tham, 
“The Continuing Futility of the Human Rights Act” generally and especially at 681–682. 
117 Granted the outcome might have been the same in any event since the Government may do the “minimum 
necessary” to comply with a declaration of incompatibility (Ewing and Tham at 684) but that cannot be known 
for certain. 
118 Ewing and Tham, “The Continuing Futility of the Human Rights Act” at 691. 
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CASE STUDY 2: MIRANDA 
R. (on the application of Miranda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department119 looks, at 
first sight, like a step in the right direction. The court issued a declaration of incompatibility 
against the offending legislation regardless of the facts of the instant case. Yet the curious 
(and, it is argued, inconsistent) conclusion was reached that there had been no breach of Mr 
Miranda’s rights. 
Miranda was, like Beghal, detained and questioned under schedule 7 of the Terrorism 
Act 2000. In contrast to Beghal, however, Miranda was detained for nine hours (the 
maximum allowed under the legislation at the time, since reduced to six hours)120 and he had 
encrypted storage devices retained. Miranda, the husband of journalist Glenn Greenwald, was 
carrying encrypted data originally obtained by Edward Snowden which was intended to be 
used in Greenwald’s journalistic activity. The court found Miranda’s detention to be 
proportionate because national security concerns outweighed his rights “on the facts of this 
case”.121 Notwithstanding that fact, the court went on to make a declaration of incompatibility 
of paragraph 2(1) of schedule 7 with Article 10 ECHR in respect of “journalistic material”.122 
The court was concerned that the powers to seize and copy data under schedule 7 gave no 
effective protection of journalists’ Article 10 rights, thus undermining confidentiality and 
having a “chilling effect” on journalism.123  
It seems odd that the court decided to make the declaration late in the judgment, 
almost as an afterthought, when we know from cases such as Beghal that the legality of the 
                                                     
119 [2016] EWCA Civ 6. 
120 Terrorism Act 2000 sched.7, para.6A inserted by the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 
sched.9, para.2. 
121 Miranda at [84] per Dyson M.R. To emphasise the point, the exact phrase appears twice in the same short 
paragraph. 
122 Defined rather circuitously by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s.13(1) as “material acquired or 
created for the purposes of journalism”. 
123 Miranda at [113] per Dyson M.R. 
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legislation itself is a prior test to issues such as proportionality.124 Indeed the court’s findings 
in Miranda are contradictory. The court could have held that Miranda’s detention was lawful 
and made the declaration at the same time if it had held that he was not carrying “journalistic 
material”. There was at least a question mark over that issue since Miranda is not a journalist 
and did not claim when stopped to be carrying such material.125 The court held, however, that 
the police and examining officers ought to have erred on the side of conducting themselves 
on the basis that Miranda was, or might have been, carrying such material.126 The court could 
also have held that Miranda’s detention was lawful and made the declaration if the 
declaration had been restricted to journalistic material which could identify a confidential 
source (which was not a factor in the present case—the source was well known).127 But 
having found that Miranda’s case fell squarely under the facts based on which the legislation 
was being declared incompatible, the court ought not to have found that Miranda’s own 
detention was justified. The only sense in which Miranda’s detention was lawful is in the 
sense that the examining officer was entitled to act as he did under primary legislation.128 
Indeed, public authorities continue to act lawfully under incompatible legislation until 
governmental action is taken.129 But the court did not give any of those reasons for Miranda’s 
detention being lawful. The court said that Miranda’s detention was lawful because it was 
proportionate. Incompatible legislative provisions cannot be used proportionately. Having 
held that schedule 7 was incompatible insofar as journalistic material was concerned, and 
having held that Miranda was carrying journalistic material, the court should have held that 
Miranda’s rights were breached (albeit that the only difference in outcome for Miranda would 
                                                     
124 Beghal v D.P.P. [2015] UKSC 49 at [33] per Lord Hughes, with whom Lord Hodge agreed. 
125 Miranda at [65], although the argument that he was in fact carrying journalistic material was later central to 
his case. 
126 Miranda at [67] per Dyson M.R. 
127 Miranda at [107]. 
128 C. Gardner, “The Self-contradictory Miranda Appeal Ruling” Head of Legal Blog, January 19, 2016. 
129 Gardner, “The Self-contradictory Miranda Appeal Ruling”; HRA ss.4(6) and 6(2). 
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have been the “satisfaction” of being able to say that “his human rights” had been 
breached).130 
Miranda shows the court using a case-specific approach and a broader approach at the 
same time, with inconsistent consequences. If the legislation is incompatible, then it is 
incompatible for everyone caught under it. A breach must go hand in hand with a declaration, 
unless, as is explained further below, the applicant was not actually caught under the 
impugned legislation. Miranda shows the court, then, getting it half right. Gone is the 
reluctance to make a declaration without a victim as in Lancashire C.C. and Beghal. But, 
sadly, in its place stands a new mistake—a glaring inconsistency. 
 
TOWARDS A BETTER APPROACH 
During the Human Rights Bill’s passage through Parliament, Lord Irvine (then Lord 
Chancellor, and architect of the Bill) said that declarations of incompatibility would be 
unnecessary “in 99 per cent. of cases that will arise”.131 Such statements have set the tone for 
judicial caution around section 4,132 and what has been criticised as overreliance on section 
3.133 But why did the Lord Chancellor feel the need to all but strangle section 4 at birth? His 
explanation for the lack of importance of section 4 was that reliance could be placed on 
section 3 and the public authority provisions (sections 6–8) instead. But those provisions 
have limitations. Section 3 has proved controversial,134 and cannot be used where it would 
constitute “judicial vandalism”.135 Use of section 3 would not, for example, have been 
appropriate in Beghal where there were numerous potential incompatibilities each with 
                                                     
130 Gardner, “The Self-contradictory Miranda Appeal Ruling”, emphasis in original. 
131 HL Deb., vol.585 col.840 (February 5, 1998) (Lord Chancellor (Irvine)). 
132 Irvine’s words were quoted by Lord Steyn to affirm that a declaration of incompatibility was a measure of 
“last resort” in R. v A. (No.2) [2001] UKHL 25 at [44]. 
133 See, for example, D. Nicol, “Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights after Anderson” [2004] P.L. 274. 
134 See the discussion above of the Conservative Party’s Bill of Rights plans. 
135 R. (on the application of Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKHL 46 at [30] 
per Lord Bingham. 
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numerous possible remedies. For example, judges should not decide what the maximum 
period of detention of six hours should be reduced to (would four hours be appropriate? Or 
two?) The question of striking the balance between a person’s Convention rights and the need 
for the examining officer to gather information is not a question for a judge to resolve. In 
addition, encouraging reliance on the public authority provisions is also problematic. Those 
provisions will not kick in in every case.136 Even where they do, as was argued above, public 
authorities should not be held to blame for operating within the parameters of perfectly valid 
legislation. 
 Of course not every court can make a declaration of incompatibility and so the 
approach recommended here cannot be followed on every occasion an incompatibility is 
present. County courts should, however, bear in mind (and be encouraged to use) their ability 
to transfer a case to the High Court if the question of a declaration of incompatibility comes 
up.137  
The Supreme Court should be particularly robust in making section 4 declarations. 
Declarations of incompatibility have the advantage of opening up the speedy procedure for 
amending the offending legislation under section 10 of the HRA. Section 10 is only available 
once all appeals have been exhausted or abandoned. It has been argued that the Government 
responds too slowly to declarations of incompatibility, taking around two or three years to 
remedy the defect.138 Part of this process, however, is frequently the lengthy process of 
appeal, which is surely unavoidable. Of more concern is undue delay once the decision has 
become final (or, of course, where the incompatibility is not removed at all as in the well-
known prisoners’ voting saga).139 Section 10 offers the opportunity for a speedier resolution 
                                                     
136 See, for example, the discussion of Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30; [2004] 2 A.C. 557 below. 
137 CPR 30.3(2)(g). 
138 Blackstone’s Guide, at para.4.82. 
139 See Smith v Scott [2007] CSIH 9; 2007 S.C. 345 and Ministry of Justice, Responding to Human Rights 
Judgments, Cm. 8962 (2014), at p.46 (subsequently “Responding to Human Rights Judgments”). 
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than remedial legislation having to be passed by Parliament, as well as not unduly clogging 
up precious parliamentary time. 
Being a prospective Henry VIII power,140 however, section 10 itself is not immune 
from criticism.141 Such legislation can be seen as threatening sovereignty by allowing the 
executive to amend primary legislation whenever enacted. It is contended here, however, that 
section 10 is an appropriate power for the reasons persuasively advanced by Barber and 
Young.142 Namely, section 10 orders are an appropriate form of constitutional self-defence, 
protecting “one part of the Constitution … the citizen, against Parliament”.143 Furthermore, 
remedial orders made under section 10 receive substantial parliamentary scrutiny (including 
from the Joint Committee on Human Rights) thus mitigating against the dangers often 
inherent in secondary legislation.144 As the Lord Chancellor said during the Human Rights 
Bill’s passage:145 
 
“We recognise that a power to amend primary legislation by means of a statutory instrument 
is not a power to be conferred or exercised lightly … So we have built in as much 
parliamentary scrutiny as possible. In addition, the power to make a remedial order may be 
used only to remove an incompatibility or a possible incompatibility between legislation and 
the convention. It may therefore be used only to protect human rights, not to infringe them.” 
 
                                                     
140 That is to say, a power to amend primary legislation passed after the parent Act (in this case, the HRA) by 
way of secondary legislation. 
141 For recent criticism of Henry VIII powers (but which does not mention HRA s.10 specifically) see Lord 
Judge, “Ceding Power to the Executive; the Resurrection of Henry VIII” King’s College London Lecture, April 
12, 2016. 
142 N.W. Barber and A.L. Young, “The Rise of Prospective Henry VIII Clauses and Their Implications for 
Sovereignty” [2003] P.L. 112. 
143 Barber and Young at 126. 
144 See HRA sched.2. 
145 HL Deb., vol.582 col.1231 (November 3, 1997) (Lord Chancellor (Irvine)). 
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Although the section 10 procedure has been used rarely,146 more advantage could be taken of 
it,147 whilst respecting the need for “compelling reasons” for its use.148 
Section 4’s use as a remedy of last resort is at odds what could be perceived as its 
weaknesses.149 In other words, since section 4 is not a drastic remedy like a strike down 
power, why use it so sparingly? In particular, section 4 could be criticised as not being an 
effective remedy because of the discretion afforded to the executive in deciding whether to 
remedy the breach or not. For that reason, the ECtHR does not require a section 4 declaration 
to have been sought in order for it to deem that all national remedies have been exhausted.150 
If section 4 really is (necessarily, it might be said) that weak, it could be asked why increased 
use of it is advocated here. The answer is that, so far, the system of making declarations of 
incompatibility has worked reasonably well, and the argument in this paper would allow it to 
be even more effective. It may not be perfect, but then neither is our constitution. And the 
imperfect solution fits perfectly into its imperfect landscape. Breaches of the Convention 
flagged up to Government by way of declarations of incompatibility have been remedied in 
all but one case.151 Jack Straw’s “unexploded bomb” analogy makes it clear that declarations 
are not readily ignored, but also that too many of them would be seen as a judicial attack on 
the executive. If declarations were much greater in number, we cannot be sure that they 
would be so well respected, nor that judicial/executive relations would not be strained. Others 
have noted the possibility that greater use of section 4 could leave declarations “ignored and 
                                                     
146 Only three of the 20 final declarations made by December 2014 were rectified by use of HRA s.10: 
Responding to Human Rights Judgments, at p.32. 
147 A view shared, at least at one stage, by the Joint Committee on Human Rights: Monitoring the Government’s 
Response to Court Judgments Finding Breaches of Human Rights, HL 128, HC 728 (2007), at para.119. 
148 HRA s.10(2). 
149 See e.g. T. Hickman, “The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: Going Beyond Declarations” (2014) 10(4) 
Policy Quarterly 39 and “Bill of Rights Reform and the Case for Going Beyond the Declaration of 
Incompatibility Model” [2015] N.Z.L.R. 35. 
150 Burden and Burden v United Kingdom (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 38. Before launching a case at Strasbourg, an 
applicant must have exhausted all national remedies under ECHR Art.35(1). 
151 The prisoners’ voting saga, mentioned above. 
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insignificant”.152 But the method proposed here would not result in a huge swell in the 
number of declarations of incompatibility being made by the courts because a declaration 
would only be made in cases where an incompatibility can be clearly foreseen, not in cases 
where the courts must strain too far to predict one. Although numbers are impossible to 
estimate, it could be guessed that at most a handful of additional declarations might be made 
each year. Hardly enough to overwhelm or disenchant Government; hardly enough to water 
down the clout each new declaration has. 
The issue of costs is an important practical matter to consider. The courts have 
discretion in how to award costs in cases where the issue of making a declaration arises. As 
the Human Rights Bill was going through Parliament, Government rejected a proposal to 
ensure that the Crown always paid the costs regardless of the applicant’s success. The Lord 
Chancellor decided that normal costs rules should apply so that the Crown could seek costs 
from the unsuccessful party.153 The alternative view is that citizens who have made 
unsuccessful applications should not always have costs awarded against them so as not to 
discourage challenges to constitutional rights.154 Although it may not have been 
Government’s intention, the current law would allow for the court to make a declaration of 
incompatibility even if the instant case is not particularly (or at all) compelling—and to 
award costs as the court sees appropriate in its discretion. This discretion could facilitate the 
flourishing of a “communitarian” system of human rights enforcement,155 where applicants 
are not deterred by the financial risks of litigation. The courts should bear in mind the 
“broader public interest in lawful government” when exercising their discretion in awarding 
costs—and indeed when considering whether to make a declaration.156  
                                                     
152 Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement, at p.105. 
153 HL Deb., vol.593 col.138WA (October 20, 1998) (Lord Chancellor (Irvine)). 
154 Ahnee v D.P.P. [1999] 2 A.C. 294. 
155 Miles, “Standing under the HRA” at 136, in the context of standing. 
156 Miles, “Standing under the HRA” at 150. 
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O’Brien has argued that the courts face a choice between case-specific approaches 
under sections 6–8 of the HRA (where a public authority is alleged to have acted 
incompatibly with a Convention right) or reviewing the legislation itself under sections 3 and 
4 of the HRA.157 But, from the summary presented above, the courts do not usually bifurcate 
their options in that manner. That is to say that the courts largely use a case-specific approach 
to sections 3 and 4 as well as sections 6–8. As will be explained below, it is perfectly proper 
that section 3 cases are dealt with on a case-specific basis, but such an approach is not always 
appropriate with regard to section 4. Furthermore, sometimes a choice between sections 3–4 
and 6–8 will not always be available because a public authority will not always be alleged to 
have acted contrary to a Convention right. Often the issue at stake will simply be a matter of 
legislative construction. Take the celebrated case, for example, of Ghaidan v Godin-
Mendoza.158 Neither party was a public authority in Ghaidan, but the actions of the private 
landlord (Ghaidan) in attempting to evict his tenant (Godin-Mendoza) were regulated by 
statute,159 which, under section 3 of the HRA, the court is under a duty to attempt to interpret 
compatibly with Convention rights in any case before it. 
With all of the above in mind, a general step-by-step process for courts to consider 
can be advanced. First, stage one: the court should look at the statutory wording if a statute is 
being impugned in the instant case. If there is no statute, stage two can be immediately 
proceeded to. If there is a statute, the wording of the statute must either be read compatibly 
under section 3 or a declaration of incompatibility may be made under section 4. In applying 
the section 3 test, we need to look at the actual circumstances of the case and ask whether 
there has been a breach of a Convention right or rights in this particular case. This is 
important in section 3 applications because section 3 directs the court to read and give effect 
to the legislation in a compatible way. The legislation can only be “read and given effect” to 
                                                     
157 O’Brien, “Legislative or Applied Review?”. 
158 [2004] UKHL 30. 
159 Rent Act 1977 sched.1, para.2(2). 
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if there would otherwise be a breach in the instant case.160 For example, thinking back to the 
Ghaidan case, the case turned upon whether Godin-Mendoza, whose deceased partner was a 
protected tenant, was able to become a statutory tenant by succession. If so, he could not be 
evicted from the property as the landlord sought. To be a statutory tenant, Godin-Mendoza 
had to be living with the protected tenant as “his or her wife or husband”.161 The 
complicating factor was that Godin-Mendoza and the deceased had been in a homosexual 
relationship, while the statutory language at that time recognised only heterosexual 
relationships. In the event, the court used section 3 of the HRA to interpret stable, 
homosexual relationships as falling within the remit of the statutory scheme. If, however, 
Godin-Mendoza had not been the deceased’s life partner but instead had been his boyfriend 
of three weeks (“Hypothetical Godin-Mendoza”), there would have been no breach of 
Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR (because a heterosexual surviving partner in the same 
situation would not have been a statutory tenant either) and no application of section 3 in the 
case of Hypothetical Godin-Mendoza. A case-specific approach must be the correct one in 
relation to section 3. 
If the court decides that section 3 cannot be used, then it must then consider section 4 
if it is a higher court with the power to do so. In deciding whether or not to make a 
declaration, the individual circumstances of the instant case may be of less significance. Of 
course we must look at those circumstances first of all, not least to determine whether the 
applicant herself suffered a breach. For example, were a declaration of incompatibility to be 
made in Hypothetical Godin-Mendoza’s case, he could legitimately (in contrast to Miranda) 
be told that there was no breach of his Convention rights. The situation is different from 
Miranda because we are not saying that Hypothetical Godin-Mendoza’s treatment is 
proportionate, we are simply saying that he is not caught within the four corners of the 
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statutory scheme. That, however, does not affect the court’s ability to make a declaration of 
incompatibility of legislation that is brought to its attention, even if a breach is not 
established in the instant case, and/or the legislation is not incompatible in every possible 
application. Granted, section 3 was used in Ghaidan and the present approach advocates a 
use of section 4 but, as will be argued below, this approach does not preclude the possibility 
of a later use of section 3 with regard to the same provision. 
If, however, the legislation is thought to be compatible, or there is no legislation in the 
present case, the court must then consider stage two: looking at sections 6–8 to consider 
whether the case concerns a public authority. If so, the court must consider whether that 
authority has acted in breach of a Convention right in this particular case, and in a way not 
permitted by any legislation. In other words, sections 6–8 will only be used where the 
legislation itself is in order and it is the public authority who have erred. Cases such as Percy, 
discussed above, show this process in operation. Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 
struck, in the court’s opinion, the right balance between a protestor’s freedom of expression 
under Article 10 and the right of onlookers not to be harassed, alarmed or distressed. But that 
balance had not been struck in the instant case and so Percy’s conviction was incompatible 
with her Article 10 right and was therefore quashed.  
Percy can be contrasted with Beghal, where the examining officer would have been 
perfectly entitled under the relevant legislation to hold Beghal for up to six hours 
(“Hypothetical Beghal”), despite the misgivings the court had about that provision. And if the 
examining officer had done so, Hypothetical Beghal would have had no section 8 claim 
because the examining officer’s approach was sanctioned by legislation. If such a section 8 
claim were successful, it would seem unfair to the examining officer who acted as she was 
entitled to do under the relevant legislation (subject to her acting in line with any 
governmental or internal policies and believing that such a length of detention was necessary 
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and proportionate). In addition, for such a challenge to be allowed, it would require the court 
to hold that the impugned legislation could be read compatibly with Convention rights.162 
Such a decision seems difficult to reconcile with clear parliamentary intention. Continuing 
with the Percy and Beghal comparison, the broad and vague terms of section 5 of the Public 
Order Act 1986 require the court to decide whether an action was “threatening or abusive” 
and whether it was likely to cause “harassment, alarm or distress”. All of those deliberately 
open-ended terms will depend upon the context and are open to interpretation by both the 
decision-maker and the court. It is perfectly possible that the court’s interpretation will differ 
from that of the decision-maker. To begin to question section 5’s compatibility beyond the 
instant case would lead the court down a best-avoided murky path of hypotheticals. By 
contrast, schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 allows discretion for the decision-maker 
within defined and clear limits—for example, that items may be retained for seven days,163 or 
that persons may be held for up to six hours.164 Such terms are not vague, and not open to 
interpretation. If an examining officer decides to hold a person for six hours, for example, the 
court cannot give the legislation a compatible interpretation and hold that the examining 
officer acted unlawfully because two hours (for example) is the most a person can be held 
for. In other words, the court is not looking at a wide range of hypothetical actions like it 
would have had to do in Percy, but can see quite clearly from the face of the statute that an 
incompatibility will arise in other cases. The court in Beghal was faced with legislation which 
screams its incompatibility, and in such cases the court should not plead deafness. The 
finding of a declaration would have arisen naturally from the issues discussed in the case 
without straying off-limits into hypothetical territory. If it can be quite obviously seen that 
legislation cannot be interpreted compatibly under section 3 of the HRA it should be declared 
incompatible regardless of the strength of the present case. 
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It is always possible that, in another case with another set of facts, the court thinks 
that section 3 of the HRA could be used instead. But there is no harm in making a section 4 
declaration in the earlier case. After making a section 4 declaration, section 3 could be used 
in a later case in the unlikely event that that declaration has been ignored, or in the more 
likely event that it has been overturned on appeal. Although we have seen that a court may 
choose not to make a further declaration of incompatibility on an issue where a declaration 
has already been made,165 it would be an entirely different matter for a court to use section 3 
on a provision which has already been declared incompatible under section 4. Although that 
state of affairs seems contradictory, it is entirely possible to envisage a scenario where it 
could occur (albeit that such a scenario might occur rarely). For example, returning once 
again to Ghaidan, where section 3 was applied. Section 3 could not have been applied in 
Hypothetical Godin-Mendoza’s case because there would be nothing to give effect to—there 
was no breach of Hypothetical Godin-Mendoza’s Convention rights. But a declaration of 
incompatibility could have been made because the relevant provisions were clearly 
incompatible with Articles 8 and 14 in that they discriminated against long-term homosexual 
couples. In the event that that declaration was overturned or ignored, and a case identical to 
the actual facts of Ghaidan occurred, the court could then use section 3, as it did, even if a 
section 4 declaration had already been made in the earlier hypothetical case. There is nothing 
contradictory about saying that a piece of legislation is incompatible, because it could not be 
read compatibly in one case, but then reverting to section 3 when a case comes along where a 
compatible reading can be made. Part of the possibility of interpretation under section 3 
depends as much on the instant case as it does on the piece of legislation. In both Ghaidan 
and Hypothetical Ghaidan the legislation, of course, is the same, but the facts of the case are 
vital to section 3 interpretations—not so for section 4 declarations. 
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Adjudication is commonly thought to serve two purposes: dispute resolution and 
exposition.166 Dispute resolution, traditionally seen as the main purpose of adjudication, is, as 
the name suggests, designed to resolve a dispute between two parties and to provide a 
remedy. It is, however, “ill suited” to constitutional adjudication.167 It certainly does not 
describe fully what the courts do when using section 4 of the HRA, given that no remedy is 
given to the instant applicant. Exposition, on the other hand, is most often seen as an ancillary 
function of adjudication. It is designed to expound the law and to provide guidance for future 
scenarios, not just the instant case. For declarations of incompatibility, however, the roles are 
reversed—their main purpose is in fact exposition and dispute resolution is incidental. There 
therefore seems to be no reason to limit declarations to the instant dispute between the 
parties. 
Despite advancing an argument in favour of expository justice being the main, rather 
than ancillary, function of the courts, Spann warned that there were two dangers to be 
guarded against. First, care must be taken that the courts do not usurp the legislature; and 
second, the courts must be well-informed and must exercise their function prudently.168 The 
argument advanced in this paper heeds both of those warnings. Declarations of 
incompatibility, by their very nature, do not threaten the legislature. Indeed, in line with 
Spann’s thesis, they merely allow the courts to provide “useful information to the executive 
and the legislature”.169 The second warning reminds us that declarations cannot be made 
unless the incompatibility is clearly apparent without the court having to stretch its 
imagination too far. It is “easier, and safer, to expound a principle in a particular factual 
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168 Spann, “Expository Justice” at 632. 
169 Spann, “Expository Justice” at 586. 
  
38 
context than in the abstract”.170 But in certain cases, such as Beghal, “particular factual 
contexts” beyond the instant case are not abstract at all, but almost certain to arise. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The UK courts have shown reluctance and confusion towards their novel power under section 
4 of the HRA. They could employ a more consistent approach by, where possible, reviewing 
legislation on its face when considering whether to make a declaration of incompatibility. 
They should feel more comfortable to take such action because unlike the US courts, our 
courts do not exercise a strike down power and declarations of incompatibility, however 
persuasive they may be, do not affect the ongoing validity of an Act. The duties imposed 
under the Human Rights Act render the higher UK courts as quasi-constitutional courts, 
therefore it is not appropriate to compare their approach with that of the ECtHR, nor is it 
desirable to adhere slavishly to the traditional domestic judicial approach. Finally, and most 
compellingly, the courts are under a duty to act in the manner endorsed here under the terms 
of the HRA itself. Nothing on the face of the HRA necessitates the existence of a victim 
before section 4 can be used—indeed Parliament itself explicitly rejected such a requirement. 
As is obvious from the face of the Act, the use of section 4 provides no remedy for the 
applicant anyway. By concentrating too much on the facts of the instant case, the courts have 
conflated the rationale of section 4 with the rationale of sections 3 and 6–8. 
It has been argued elsewhere that the courts restrict section 4 use because of “the 
enduring influence of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty”.171 But it is curious that the 
courts have used section 3 more liberally,172 whilst holding back on section 4 when section 3 
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is the greater (and more insidious) threat to sovereignty.173 By straining to avoid making 
declarations of incompatibility, the courts have actually shown undue deference to the 
executive at the expense of parliamentary intent.174 Yet governmental plans to restrict section 
3, rather than section 4, suggest that the courts may have misjudged the situation—the 
“dialogue” the HRA was intended to provide is not especially healthy. It may also be that 
section 3 has been more warmly embraced by the courts because it is seen by them as simply 
an extension of their existing powers of interpretation—it is not “radically new”.175 Section 4, 
on the other hand, is a much more alien power to come to terms with. Even making criticisms 
of legislation beyond the instant facts of the case, as the court did in Beghal, has been 
described as “unusual”.176 But the courts, as our “guardians and interpreters of fundamental 
rights”,177 should not shy away from looking beyond the facts where appropriate. Although 
the common law may traditionally be seen as embodying a dispute resolution model of 
adjudication because of its case-by-case approach, an expository function governing “future 
relations between persons not represented before the court” lies at the very heart of a system 
of law founded on precedent and reasoned judgments.178 In that sense, expository justice is 
nothing new for our courts. Nor is expressing a view on problems with the law and potential 
ways to remedy them, yet deferring to Parliament by applying the current (“bad”) law.179 
Similarly, the giving of advice as to how to remedy incompatibilities is central to section 4 
and is not constitutionally problematic as long as such advice is not automatically followed 
unreflectingly by Government. Scepticism of any form of advice-giving relies on an “unduly 
                                                     
173 See e.g. Lord Lester, “Developing Constitutional Principles of Public Law” [2001] P.L. 684 at 691: “It is 
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rigid” notion of the separation of powers, rather than allowing “[t]he three branches of 
government … to work in harmony”.180 
The courts should not routinely be pondering hypotheticals, but when 
incompatibilities leap out from the text of the statute, as they did in Beghal, it would be 
logical, desirable and constitutionally appropriate for the court to use section 4. The courts 
should make the most of vital opportunities to flag up incompatible legislation in the hope 
that such measures will be purged from the statute book. They should not demand that 
another person should suffer when an incompatibility has been brought to light. Instead, they 
should seize the opportunity to direct Government and Parliament to snuff that 
incompatibility out.  
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